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Storage and Starvation: Public Granaries as Agents of 
Food Security in Early Modern Europe 
Dominik Collet  
Abstract: »Horten und Hungern: Öffentliche Getreidespeicher als Agenten 
frühneuzeitlicher Food Security«. The development of the ‘food security’ con-
cept in the 1990s marked a significant change away from state-centred strate-
gies that focused on food availability, towards policies aimed at food access 
and strengthening individual ‘entitlements’ (A. Sen) to food. This essay applies 
the food security approach to early modern food regimes, drawing on the ex-
ample of the state-granary system in 18th century Prussia to investigate their 
agents, zones of conflict, and limits. The evident failure of technology-centred 
approaches raises questions about established periodisations, and modernisa-
tion narratives on the ‘great escape’ from hunger. The granary as a ‘technology 
of risk’ illustrates the social construction of ‘security’ through the labelling of 
security providers and security takers as well as the performance of exclusion 
and inclusion. 
Keywords: Food security, famine, granary, Prussia, Frederick II of Prussia, 
food regime, security regime, entitlements, exclusion. 
 
Food security is a relatively recent addition to the political concerns governing 
development, nutrition and human rights. The concept rose to prominence 
alongside ‘human security’ during several UN-sponsored conferences in the 
late 1990s. It marked a decisive shift away from earlier strategies that had 
focused not on food security, but on food availability. These earlier approaches 
considered food access only in terms of physical accessibility, resulting in 
programs to raise global food production and to ensure rapid deployment of 
stored grain during emergencies. By the 1990s, however, it had become de-
pressingly obvious that the physical availability of foodstuffs alone did very 
little to prevent malnutrition and starvation. Even though per-capita production 
of food has grown, hunger has not gone away.1  
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weltgeschichte, Seminar für Mittlere und Neuere Geschichte, Universität Göttingen, Platz 
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1  Hall 1998. The development of the ‘food security’ concept is closely related to that of 
‘human security’, sharing its shift away from state-focused approaches to a wider scope of 
providers or ‘agents’ of security, analysing multi-polar ‘governance’ instead of state ‘pol-
icy’. Translated into political action, it has also been accused of sharing the latter’s neo-
colonial undertones, facilitating the de-legitimisation and circumvention of non-Western 
governments. 
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Accordingly new approaches began to focus less on physical and more on 
economic and social access to food. These policies highlighted poverty, ine-
quality and the shifting ‘entitlements’ (A. Sen) to foodstuffs. They would look 
at individual rather than household provisions, reconsidering the skewed distri-
bution of food according to gender and age. They would identify cultural barri-
ers to certain foods and distributive practices, and analyse the wide range of 
environmental challenges to food access. In short: the concept of food security 
shifted the focus away from technological towards political, socio-economic 
and cultural factors.2  
Significantly for the historical sciences, this shift challenges established de-
marcation lines between contemporary and pre-modern societies. Railroads, for 
example – once cherished as the ultimate weapon against famine – are no 
longer regarded as crucial prerequisites to food security. In fact they have fre-
quently been shown to exert a negative impact, facilitating outward as well as 
inward flows of food during shortages.3  
In most historical narratives, however, it is still improved storage and trans-
portation, silos and railways which delineate the advent of supposedly ‘mod-
ern’ and ‘secure’ food regimes. Historians have by and large ignored the chal-
lenge of development economics and held on to established modernisation 
narratives. Accordingly, they have focused predominantly on technological 
developments that supposedly mark a clear break, ‘the great escape’ to use 
David Arnold’s term, from the pre-modern cycle of perpetual subsistence cri-
sis: demographic growth, climatic disaster, famine, and population decline.4  
This essay will test the reach of the ‘food security’ concept on one promi-
nent example of early modern society’s food regimes that figured strongly in 
historical debates as well as in later narratives: the public granary. I will briefly 
sketch its genesis, focusing especially on late 18th century Prussia, where they 
were widely regarded as a cure-all to food insecurity. In a second part I will 
discuss some of the conflicts that surrounded these structures and try to explain 
their ultimate failure to provide secure food access by looking at their socio-
economic and cultural role in early modern societies. Finally, I will use these 
observations to speculate on the more general issues of security and risk as well 
as their periodisation. 
The Ecology of the Granary 
For most of the developed world, hunger resides in the past. In 2006 a study 
claimed that the 800 million clinically obese people now slightly surpass the 
                                                             
2  Hall 1998, Chapter 3: The History of Food Security. 
3  Davis 2002, 26-27, 332. 
4  Arnold 1988, 68-72. 
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numbers of malnourished humans living on our planet.5 This ‘balanced’ pic-
ture, however, cannot mask the fact that food deficiency has never left us, 
neither in the so-called developing world, nor in the industrialised nations. In 
fact, one of the reasons politicians in the West have embraced the ‘food secu-
rity’ concept is the possibility of re-labelling the increasing number of poor 
people in Western, industrialised countries as ‘food insecure’, thereby avoiding 
the politically far more damaging term: hungry.  
Even though the ‘right to food’ has only recently been incorporated into 
many national laws, the protection from want has always been a policy corner-
stone. Indeed it lies at the very heart of why humans form a society. To secure 
access to food for his people is the prime responsibility of any ruler and a 
foundation of legitimate government. Some of the oldest written documents 
describe grain supply as a crucial statecraft. Chinese texts from the 5th century 
BC reckon that provisions for 9 years are advisable while 3 years are necessary 
for any government to survive and that only “when the granaries are full [the 
people] will know propriety and moderation.” Similar provisions abound in 
Roman scripture and the Bible.6  
Public granaries can be found in most complex societies. The growth of 
towns constituted one of the driving factors for ever larger granaries. The ruins 
of ancient Rome’s public storehouses or the massive Chinese ‘ever-normal’ 
granaries continue to amaze people today.7 Europe’s earliest surviving build-
ings date from the heyday of medieval cities. Later public granaries followed 
the increasing division of labour to the sites of mines, manufactories and mili-
tary garrisons that often lay too far away from farming resources to support 
their residents. In the 17th and 18th centuries, granaries rapidly expanded 
alongside the early modern state and its growing populations. 
Early modern granaries occupied increasingly massive structures (Illustra-
tion 1). They were designed to support heavy weights and to protect the grain 
from fire, moisture and rodents, storing it in waist-high boxes, often on multi-
ple low storeys with a raised ground floor and double walls to keep out humid-
ity.8 Their solid appearance also reflected positively on their communal or 
noble patrons, visualising their respective commitment to the support of sub-
jects or citizens, very much helped by the fact that granaries had to be placed in 
easy reach of large populations and were often situated right in the city centre 
(Illustration 2). A prominently positioned granary also marked and illustrated 
security claims in opposition to other providers of relief such as the church or 
                                                             
5  BBC, “Overweight ‘top world’s hungry’” 2006. 
6  Cf. Will and Wong 1991, 2, 15, who also consider the establishment of a comprehensive 
public granaries system in early modern China as a consequence of the Quing conquerors’ 
increased need for legitimisation. 
7  Cf. Rickman 1988. 
8  On the structural design and the turning and preservation techniques of early modern grana-
ries, cf. Dinglinger 1768. 
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private charity. Granaries only lost their prominence when improved transpor-
tation made it possible to store grain close to the producer and free precious 
city space during the 19th century. Even in today’s distributed markets, how-
ever, the German government still keeps a strategic ‘Bundesreserve’ (federal 
reserve) of grain, stored in secret locations according to the ‘Ernährungssicher-
stellungsgesetz’ (food securitisation law) which last provided uncontaminated 
food supplies during the Chernobyl fallout of 1986.9  
Illustration 1: Vertical Section of an Ideal Granary (1768) 
 
Dinglinger 1768, Table 1 (Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen). 
 
This brief sketch of the granary’s genesis already hints at some zones of 
conflict. Many depots originated not from the need to provide secure food, but 
to store tribute grain – grain constituting not just a food resource but a form of 
currency in pre-monetary societies.10 The appearance of granaries in towns, 
mining villages and the sites of factories illustrates the momentous inequalities 
in supply between producers and consumers. Similarly, the construction of 
storage for military purposes foreshadows conflicts of access and precedence, 
relief and war. Finally many granaries, such as the Roman storehouses, started 
as private enterprises and became ‘public’, that is controlled by the authorities, 
only through coercion or forceful appropriation – a process that indicates di-
                                                             
9  These reserves cover only a few weeks demand and would thus have met with strong 
disapproval from ancient China’s statesmen. Cf. Horn 2005. 
10  Cf. Karl Polanyi’s concept of the storage economy and ‘Staple Finance vs. Market Finance’ 
in his pioneering work on the cultural anthropology of economics: Polanyi et al. 1957, esp. 
243-270. 
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verging interest between private trade, governments and consumers.11 Grana-
ries occupied a strongly contested field, divided between the state and private 
actors, military and humanitarian interests as well as fiscal and charitable poli-
cies. 
Illustration 2: Mauthalle, Nuremberg, 
Built by Hans Behaim the Elder as a Public Granary in 1498-1502. 
 
      Photography: Andreas Praefcke. 
The Prussian ‘Granary State’ 
All these ruptures are visible in what is possibly the most daring and most 
highly publicised European endeavour at a comprehensive storage system: the 
Prussian state granaries of the 18th century. Contrary to what a host of accom-
panying tracts claimed, their origins lie not in the people’s welfare or economic 
policy. Instead they owe their existence to the effects of the ‘military revolu-
tion’. The need to support a large, well-disciplined and increasingly mobile 
army without damage to the growing fiscal state required an extended provi-
sioning system.12 However, the enormous costs of their upkeep in peacetime 
quickly generated ideas about additional uses.  
                                                             
11  Rickman 1988, 164-173. 
12  Cf. Atorf 1999, 66-67. 
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Grain deficits were common in Prussia as in most of Europe. The effects of 
the Little Ice Age and rapid demographic growth resulted in large parts of the 
population going hungry or living close to subsistence level. Three major har-
vest failures in 1709, 1740 and 1771 as well as the aftermath of the Seven 
Years’ War led to all-out famines, with population losses of up to 10%. But 
even in normal years, grain prices fluctuated and rose steadily the longer the 
harvest had passed, indicating that few people could afford to stockpile provi-
sions in autumn.13 
Eminent cameralists such as Justi, Bergius or Sonnenfels argued that the fi-
nances tied up in state granaries could be put to use by employing them as 
price-balancing mechanisms. By releasing grain when the price was high, and 
buying when the price was low, they could support grain producers and city 
consumers in turn through a ‘just price’.14 Others petitioned for the granaries to 
artificially inflate prices, thereby supporting grain producers and preventing 
servants and labourers from becoming “willfull and unruly” in times of abun-
dance.15 Many more lobbied for low prices in order to stimulate trade and in-
dustry and assist city artisans or even the poor.16 Some scholars pointed to the 
success of contemporary fire insurance and argued for an extension of granary 
schemes to cover the whole population, thereby exterminating the hated grain 
traders often denounced as ‘Corn-Jews’.17  
The 1709 famine spurred some of these plans into action in Prussia, but 
when another harvest failed in 1721 most of these new granaries were found 
empty.18 Prussia’s granary schemes finally gathered momentum when Freder-
ick II became king in 1740 during yet another catastrophically failed harvest. 
He immediately realised the granaries political potential and dramatically 
opened Berlin’s magazines to coincide with his accession ceremonies (Illustra-
tion 3). A fresh spell of new granaries followed, leaving Prussia with 32 major 
state magazines at the beginning of war in 1756. 
While they served the Prussian war effort well during the extended cam-
paigns of the Seven Years’ War, they also helped to combat the sharp price 
hikes that followed the military clashes.19  
                                                             
13  Von Münchhausen 1772, 118 and Abel 1972, 34-37. 
14  Cf. Bergius 1777 and Justi 1771, 4, 22 and 96; Sonnenfels 1777, 376-381. 
15  D. V., “Untersuchung“ 1752, 136. 
16  Justi 1771, 75-78, 102. 
17  D. V., “Untersuchung” 1752, 136 and Wehrs 1791, 142. 
18  Atorf 1999, 124. 
19  Atorf 1999, 182, 214. 
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Illustration 3: Johann David Schleuen, Berlin’s Grain Magazines are Opened 
During the Famine of 1740 on Occasion of the Oath of Allegiance to 
Frederick II 
 
                     In: Schultz 1988, 44. 
 
Their biggest challenge, though, was still to come. In 1770 a sharp winter 
with snow that lasted until June followed by catastrophic rainfall destroyed 
crops all over central Europe.20 What ensued has been branded by Borussophile 
historiography as an “immensely successful fight against famine”, “an example 
of superior social policy”21 that transformed Prussia into “an island of secu-
rity”22, thereby following the assessment of Frederick II in his famous ‘political 
testament’: 
                                                             
20  A comprehensive study of this momentous disaster is still lacking. An overview can be 
found in: Abel 1972, 191-266. 
21  Atorf 1999, 385 closely following the assessment of Naudé 1905, 178. 
22  Hinrich 1933. 
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In the year 1770 frost destroyed all crops. Fresh suffering threatened the peo-
ple [....]. The King, however, had great granaries in Silesia and other places. 
These wise measures protected his people from famine [...]. The agony ex-
perienced by the subjects of other states was due to the fact that no country 
save Prussia had [sufficient] grain magazines. Only here was one prepared for 
emergency and could resolve it by policies dictated by reason.23 
Historical sources covering grain and food supply abound, as their supervi-
sion resided at the core of early modern government. In the case of Prussia, 
however, a critical rereading of the sources is complicated by substantial 
losses, the limited governmental perspective of surviving documents and the 
political spin the administration deliberately introduced to embellish their own 
efforts.24 This tendency is further aggravated by the fact that for the ordinary 
consumer the bakery, not the storehouse, constituted the point of contact with 
governmental food regimes.  
However, even the few surviving records show that at the start of 1770 the 
granaries lay half-empty. King Frederick’s repeated appeals to his administra-
tors to buy grain during the bumper crop of the previous year had been futile. 
Most of them were military men who saw few merits in this laborious task 
during peacetime.25 They were supported by local landowners eager to avoid 
the strenuous transport to outlying depots. Cunning merchants even managed to 
convince the authorities to support the export of grain, as the recent war had 
supposedly shrunk the population and “led to a higher percentage of children 
who need less food”.26 As the state benefited from export taxes and was itself 
one of the largest producers of grain, permission was granted promptly. Ac-
cordingly, all through 1770 Prussia continued to export large quantities of 
grain. When the central administration finally realised the extent of the shortfall 
and closed all borders, the Frisian territories had already managed to sell the 
largest share of their reserves at good profit to the prosperous Dutch states 
rather than the state granaries.27 The King was soon petitioned for magazine 
                                                             
23  Volz and Oppeln-Bronikowski 1913, 63-64. 
24  As large parts of the Preussische Kriegsmagazinsverwaltungsakten have been lost, most 
modern studies had to fall back on Skalweit’s edition of documents, often, however, with-
out reflecting on their tendentious and highly selective nature. A prominent example is 
Atorf’s dissertation (Atorf 1999) that credulously echoes Skalweit’s benign assessments. 
For a rare critical assessment of Frederick II poor policies see: Kluge 1987. 
25  Cf. Cabinet Orders, Berlin Dec-Jan 1769/79, in: Skalweit 1931, 258-259. 
26  Nor did the report from Silesia fail to mention potatoes and meliorations, two favourite 
projects of the Prussian sovereign: Skalweit 1931, 267.  
27  Correspondence of the General Directory with the Chamber of East Frisia, in: Skalweit 
1931, 268-287. The reports illustrate the scope for strategic disinformation by local parties 
with trading interests. Harvest predictions only changed from “quite good” to a catastrophic 
“loss of 50%” when challenged by the centre. Similarly, Magdeburg’s petitions to continue 
free trade in order to acquire grain from abroad were soon suspected of being pretexts for 
internal grain speculation. Accordingly, the administration had to resort to sending out in-
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supplies from all regions. Quite unusual for his time, Frederick II dealt with 
many of these supplications personally. His focus, however, was centred firmly 
on provisioning the army and the capital city. Rural petitioners were addressed 
in Frederick’s usual candid style: “I have nothing to give, go and buy on the 
market” or “What an evil letter! They are a restless and riotous people”, or 
“They must be mad, in Saxony grain stands at twice the price” or “The village 
is right on the border, they must have sold their grain to the Saxons, and now 
they dare expect it back from our magazine!”28  
When the harvest catastrophically failed for a second and even a third time 
in 1771 and 1772, complaints reached the King of his famished subjects being 
reduced to eating unhealthy food substitutes for sustenance. Storage grain was 
accordingly provided for soldiers and their families, who constituted a large 
part of the population in Prussia.29 Supplies, however, largely failed to reach 
the poor, who were expected to pay ‘normal’ grain prices at a time when they 
had spent their assets, often including all their possessions and even their 
clothes.30 At the same time, many soldiers and well-to-do citizens were able to 
resell magazine grain to rich city consumers at substantial premiums.31 As the 
magazines emptied rapidly, the administration stepped up campaigns against 
scapegoats: “Corn-Jews” who supposedly hoarded grain, distillers, rich for-
eigners or the “lazy”, “idle” or “incompetent” tradesmen who failed to provide 
relief.32 
In this situation the king chose to move his troops deep into neighbouring 
Poland under the pretext of erecting a safety cordon against epidemics raging 
there. This strategy proved successful in two ways. It provided forage for the 
large number of soldiers involved and yielded, through force, intimidation and 
requisitioning, fresh grain supplies for the King’s granaries. The move effi-
ciently turned the granaries from storehouses into clearing-houses of Polish 
grain.33 While it exported the famine eastwards, it allowed the King to uphold 
                                                                                                                                
spection teams of their own recruited from the military: Skalweit 1931, 269, 278-279 and 
Cabinet Orders to the Ministers Hagen and Derschau, Sep. 26th, 1770, Skalweit 1931, 271. 
28  Skalweit 1931, 275, 307-308. 
29  Skalweit 1931, 109. 
30  While the intention to provide for the poor (“die Armuth”) was occasionally mentioned, 
specifications for handouts listed soldiers and their families only. See Skalweit 1931, 273. 
The administration certainly hoped that provisioning the military – often more than 30% of 
Prussia’s urban consumers – would reduce market pressure with benefits to other consum-
ers. The inflexible demand for grain, however, resulted in sharp price hikes even during 
smaller shortfalls, quickly pricing the poor out of the market.  
31  Skalweit 1931, 312. 
32  Skalweit 1931, 281, 285-286, 291, 309 and Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbe-
sitz, I. HA, Rep. 96B, Nr. 72 (1771), 441 and (1772), 395. 
33  Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, I. HA, Rep. 96B, Nr. 72 (1771), 146, 163, 
261, 308, 324, 333, 342 and (1772), 61, 140-141. The famine eventually proved consequen-
tial for the ensuing First Partition of a weakened Poland in 1772. Frederick II’s eager en-
quiries about the magazine supplies of his rivals illuminate the extent to which he regarded 
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the well-publicised fiction of granaries as sources of food security, even though 
they served only a selected few, had been plagued by neglect, and encouraged 
complacency, profiteering and misappropriation.  
Illustration 4: The Great Granary in Berlin-Kreuzberg (1801-1805) 
 
Engraving by T. Barber. Landesarchiv Berlin / Photography Marburg. 
 
At the height of the crisis the price of grain almost tripled, a disaster for a 
population that regularly spent two-thirds of their income on food. It resulted in 
a serious rise in deaths from starvation, exhaustion and disease as well as a 
significantly reduced rate of marriages and offspring. Indeed, fear and despera-
tion had become so widespread that even two average harvests in 1773 and 
1774 failed to improve the situation. Many countrymen anxiously held onto 
their food, leading to a renewed wave of accusations against suspected “Jewish 
mischief”.34  
                                                                                                                                
granaries as part of warfare rather than provisioning: Volz 1913, 354, 400, 472, 584, 673. 
At a ministerial request for rural aid he replied: “My war magazines are not built with the 
intention to supply subjects with bread, fodder and seed [...] To feed the country as well [as 
well as my soldiers, D.C.] is simply impossible.” Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kul-
turbesitz, I. HA, Rep. 96B, Nr. 72 (1771), 37. 
34  Skalweit 1931, 309, 651-653 and the reports about famine victims and population decline in 
Prussia in: Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, II. HA, Tit. CCLXV, Nr. 6, 
Vol. 1, 108-109 and I. HA, Rep. 96 B, Nr. 72 (1772) 15. Based on notoriously unreliable 
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The Prussian experience, however, was far from unique. In a second step I 
will therefore try to map four areas of conflict for granary-based food regimes:  
I. The Politics of Inequality 
As in the case of Prussia, granaries were often imagined and publicised as tools 
of redistribution. What they illustrate, in fact, is the high levels of inequality, 
the distorted distribution of risk, security and entitlements in a stratified soci-
ety. Food shortages pitted rich against poor, the military against civilians, pro-
ducers against consumers. They put country folk against town people, smaller 
cities against larger cities, and larger cities against capitals.35 Elsewhere, the 
local communities on Lake Constance and the Rhine struggled hard against the 
superior purchasing power of the Swiss and Dutch communes draining their 
food stocks. Similarly, the Leipzig authorities justly feared that the advent of 
the spring fair in 1771 with its influx of affluent traders would result in a fam-
ine amongst the town’s poorer inhabitants.36 
When the Prussian administration tried to fill their storehouses, they too be-
came subject to competition along those divisions. Even in famine times, Ber-
lin’s distillers turned grain into spirits to cater to the wealthy. Prussian regions 
such as Silesia, Pomerania or Minden boycotted the centre’s ‘national’ agenda 
and stopped the delivery of granary grain, while rich neighbours and private 
traders continued to buy up supplies at prices the Prussian agents could no 
longer afford to pay.37  
More often, however, the state reinforced and strengthened asymmetrical 
power relations: it prioritised the gentry, people close to the king, such as the 
Oder colonists, and above all the military (“Meine Truppen müssen leben” 
[“my troops must live”]). At the same time the rural population and the urban 
poor remained excluded from direct support.38 Civil granary distributions in 
Prussia, as well as elsewhere, remained firmly focused on the capital.39 When 
deciding on granary interventions in the periphery, the King and his administra-
tion dealt not with individuals but with communal representatives. Accord-
ingly, granary handouts never discriminated between the needs of well-off 
artisans and working poor, large landlords or smallholders, thereby supporting 
                                                                                                                                
demographical material Prussia’s population losses in 1770-1772 have been estimated at 
7%. Kluge 1987, 77. 
35  Examples of such conflicts persist even in the carefully selected edition of Skalweit 1931. 
See 286, 291, 322. 
36  Cf. Schmidt 1994, 252-272; Skalweit 1931, 284. 
37  Skalweit 1931, 285, 289-290, 310, 329. 
38  Skalweit 1931, 81, 294-296, 302, 312. 
39  Skalweit 1931, 271; Atorf 1999, 132. For non-Prussian examples see Will and Wong 1991, 
511; Kaplan 1984 or Revel 1975.  
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and even deepening social divisions.40 Means-tested distribution schemes, as 
advocated by Enlightenment thinkers such as Justi or Georg Friedrich Wehrs, 
failed to materialise as did the contemporary obsession with a disinterested 
state, levelling the playing field or a “just” or even a “natural” price suitable for 
producers, consumers, rich and poor alike.41 Instead, magazine schemes en-
acted regimes of exclusion that mirrored rather than mellowed the inequalities 
of a stratified society. 
II. The Government of Fear 
It is little wonder that under these circumstances, panic and fear of inadequate 
individual food supplies could be triggered easily. Unlike other natural disas-
ters, crop failures develop slowly, allowing plenty of room for speculation and 
rumours. Extended spells of unfavourable weather quickly fostered panic buy-
ing and hoarding. As a result, it was often the fear of shortages, not shortages 
themselves that led to rising prices and famine.42  
Granaries performed poorly as instruments of price balancing or as back-
bones of food supply. What granaries did, however, was to act as confidence 
measures. They constituted “the best security against danger” and panic.43 
Examples can be found as far back as Roman Antiquity. Emperor Augustus 
was known to have warded off imminent panic by publicly destroying granary 
grain, supposedly in order to make room for the imminent arrival of fresh 
stock. His celebrated ploy allegedly ended grain hoarding and opened up the 
cities’ frozen grain markets.44 A similar confidence trick is reported in the 
1770s from Neuwied, when the strong rains “had led the common man to be 
afraid and fear a famine”. People reacted immediately by reporting inflated 
figures of their demand and lowered ones about their supplies to the local 
Duke. The Duke, however reacted by “making it known in his city to the sound 
of drums, that fresh supplies were under way, and that until they arrived every 
man was free to take whatever he needed from the public granary” – an offer 
that supposedly restored public confidence to such an extent that only a handful 
                                                             
40  Differences in the market share play an important role in a famine economy. Accordingly, 
in 1771 price hikes meant that large estates actually managed to increase their profits even 
though the production total had fallen. At the same time flocks of small-scale farmers were 
forced to ‘sell’ future harvests at cut prices to their well-off neighbours in order to feed their 
families, thereby perpetuating their disadvantages. The King, however, regarded the 
‘Landmänner’ as a homogeneous group. Skalweit 1931, 302 (memorandum of the Minde-
ner Kammer, 26.6.1772) and 307 on the refusal to deal with individuals.  
41  Cf. Wehrs 1791, 144; Bergius 1771, 22 and Justi 1771, 83, 104-105. 
42  Münchhausen 1772, 21, 41 and 167. See also Rau 1862, 291, 295; Justi 1771, 111 and more 
generally: Ferrières 2002. 
43  Münchhausen 1772, 170. 
44  Garnsey 1988, 223-224. 
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ever took up his offer. As the Duke’s publicist remarked proudly: “We have 
created grain, without producing it.”45 
Of course, the use of the granary for political spin could turn in other direc-
tions as well. Emperor Augustus was also known to create artificial famines, 
only to relieve them by opening up his granaries in order to stage himself as a 
saviour of the Roman people.46 Similarly, many 18th-century scholars voiced 
their concerns about the high public profile of granaries as an encouragement to 
abuses. They warned that their prominent position in public policy could lead 
people to carelessly sell on their own provisions, expecting them to be replen-
ished and alimented out of public stores. Large parts of the population also 
bought into official rhetoric that opposed good granaries to evil trade, eagerly 
supporting calls for the denunciation of supposed ‘Corn-Jews’.47 
Granaries therefore amount to much more than physical sources of food. 
They constituted the nodes of a ‘security regime’ that governed food consump-
tion not just in materialistic terms, but through public discourse, scientific 
rationalities, emotions and disciplinary measures.  
III. The Moral Economy of Hunger 
While these discourses undoubtedly helped to shape the perception of food 
security and risk, they did not go unchallenged. The sources list numerous 
forms of deviance, appropriation and resistance, famously described in E. P. 
Thompson’s seminal study on the ‘Moral Economy’.48 Granaries suffered from 
persistent thefts and misappropriations by their labourers. People used fake 
identities and documents to apply for higher rations. Inflated or twisted suppli-
cations to the granaries were common and, as the Prussian records show, often 
successful. Many town dwellers managed to turn granaries into a source of 
regular supplements rather than emergency relief.49  
While such collaborative actions mark the fringes of food regimes, critics 
have also pointed to the fact that they served a small number of well-organised 
people who were able to enter into a process of negotiation.50 Indeed, for many 
of the disenfranchised poor, alternative sources of relief remained crucial. The 
churches, fraternities, guilds, neighbourhoods and extended families continued 
to be the key provider of aid and charity. Additional strategies focused on a 
rich tradition of substitute foods, sub-market economies, temporary migration 
                                                             
45  Anonymous 1787, 485-486, 496. 
46  Garnsey 1988, 220. 
47  Cf. Gailus 2001.  
48  Thompson 1971. 
49  Wehrs 1791, 138. 
50  Stevenson 1987, 218-238. 
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or even drug abuse – practices that have led Piero Camporesi to speak of a 
“culture of hunger” that effectively subverted official food regimes.51 
IV. The logic of corruption 
In addition to the play of security discourses and the practices of resilience, 
granaries faced significant structural problems. Management issues posed 
serious challenges: While the public held the sovereign accountable for provid-
ing secure food access, the day-to-day administration of the granaries was 
organised by local authorities, who were well aware of this distinction.52 Even a 
mid-sized granary such as the one in Rohrschach had a staff of 98 people: a 
director, cashiers, clerks, sworn surveyors, carriers and drivers, many with 
work that left them ample room for personal gain.53 The competing and often 
ambivalent targets of granaries – balancing prices, providing relief, securing 
military operations – gave administrators further leeway to pursue their own 
interests. Granaries were simultaneously expected to keep grain prices high to 
support farming and to keep them low to support city labourers. They were 
charged with regulating market prices, without, however, damaging the grain 
trade that swelled the state’s tax coffers. They were asked to keep stocks for 
times of dearth, while being expected to sell their stocks to pay for their own 
upkeep.54 Such inconsistencies opened granaries up to corruption and favourit-
ism. Accordingly, complaints about skewed measurements, biased price fix-
ings, bribery, and sleaze abound.55  
The scale of corruption resulted not least from the enormous sums involved. 
While grain might not have carried the same stigma as money, it was certainly 
worth as much. Prussia spent huge sums of its tax income on granaries. How-
ever, the total value of food consumed by its population vastly exceeded the 
early modern state’s financial capabilities. China – a veritable ‘granary state’ – 
devoted 25% of its total tax revenue to pay for granaries, an enormous amount 
that nevertheless bought less than 3% of annual consumption.56 Under such 
circumstances comprehensive control of food markets remained out of the 
reach of the early modern fiscal state. The considerable sums involved, how-
ever, served to attract fraud and misappropriation. 
                                                             
51  Camporesi 1989. 
52  Cf. Shiue’s discussion of Chinese granary (mis-)management which raises more general 
points on storage administration, asymmetrical information flows and competing targets: 
Shiue 2004. For the ‘loyal non-cooperation’ strategy of local elites, see: Skalweit 1931, 
284. 
53  Rau 1862, 288. 
54  For examples of conflicting and often mutually exclusive targets, see Wagemann 1802, 
266, 270 and Schreber 1772. 
55  Cf. Wagemann 1802, 272; Bergius 1771, 28-30; Wehrs 1791, 143; Skalweit 1931, 68.  
56  Shiue 2004, 105. 
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Furthermore, the state’s actions generated a string of unintended conse-
quences. Paradoxically, more security measures can encourage more risky 
behaviour.57 The protection offered by public granaries was prone to result in 
the reduction of private stocks, the delay of agricultural investment and the 
discouragement of trade, effectively increasing rather than decreasing the need 
for public grain supplements. Liberal donations of subsidised granary grain 
only tended to be bought up by affluent traders and resold elsewhere at higher 
market prices. Carefully controlled handouts, however, cut into the margins of 
local merchants, thereby damaging rather than supplementing essential mar-
kets, resulting in even greater shortfalls. Granaries could even create artificial 
famines by deterring the import of grain with their submarket price fixings or 
by driving up prices through purchases in a volatile market with an inflexible 
demand. As Reimarus briskly put it in 1770: Granaries “never produced secu-
rity, disturb the trade, and do more harm than good.” 58 
Considering the potential for political conflict, the likelihood of corruption, 
the consistent spending necessary for their upkeep and their detrimental side-
effects, the granaries’ limited impact is hardly surprising. In fact, there are 
numerous reports of granaries that had been initiated at the height of famine but 
at the onset of the next crisis were found to have been abandoned or even “dis-
appeared”.59 While public granaries undoubtedly benefited prioritised parts of 
the population and played an important declamatory role in the symbolical 
construction of security and good government, they failed as agents of food 
security in the modern sense.  
Food Security? 
There are obvious flaws in the technology-centred narrative of ‘the great es-
cape’ from hunger. Food availability does not secure food access. Even in early 
modern Europe, starvation is regularly the result of “people not having enough 
food to eat. It is not the characteristic of there being not enough food to eat” – 
to quote Amartya Sen again.60 Participation, inclusion and ‘entitlements’ to 
food are what the malnourished were missing, not food per se. The examples 
discussed here strongly suggest that the eventual reduction in famines was due 
less to agrarian ‘revolutions’, improved and bigger storage, railways or market 
                                                             
57  Cube 1990. 
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integration, than rather to changes in participation and strengthened entitle-
ments to food – a result that raises questions about the traditional periodisation 
focusing on food availability and technological change.  
It has become obvious, in fact, that public granaries are more than just a 
storage technique. They occupy a central position in a security regime that 
aimed at governing public discourse, emotions and discipline. In a marked 
departure from earlier approaches, the security it was hoped to foster was con-
ceptualised as universal.61 Its advocates saw the granary as a crucial technology 
of risk that helped societies “sich wegen der Zukunft in Sicherheit zu setzen” 
(secure themselves for the future). As a concept, this is strikingly reminiscent 
of Anthony Giddens’ ‘colonising the future’ – not least because putting it into 
practice was fraught with uncertainty, exclusion, and the creation of new 
risks.62  
Embracing the ‘food security’ approach can therefore prove instrumental in 
identifying hidden zones of conflict, reassessing state-focused approaches, 
encouraging a critical rereading of partial source material and discovering 
additional agents of security that are easily masked by modernisation narra-
tives. 
However, it has also become evident that the ‘food security’ concept em-
ploys ‘security’ in the far too limited sense of ‘safety from harm owing to pro-
tection from or the absence of danger’. While an institution such as the granary 
might have failed to provide safety from hunger, it was certainly instrumental 
in encouraging a feeling of security that – far from being a mere “security 
theatre” (B. Schneier) – could itself become an effective deterrent. 
‘Security’ in this sense is a social construction that could manifest itself in 
public discourse and practices as well as in buildings. The creation of a granary 
constituted a symbolic act that visualised political claims and secured food 
policy against competing institutions. It constituted a policy by marking its 
patrons as security conveyors and its customers as security takers, while simul-
taneously illustrating social distinction via the constant performance of inclu-
sion or exclusion. Even though it did not deliver physical access to food, it was 
thus intimately tied to the ruler’s claim to power and constituted an important 
part of pre-modern security regimes. In the words of the Duke of Neuwied: It 
created security without producing it. 
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